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In this paper, I carry out an empirical analysis of the pricing volatility of direct listings as 
compared to traditional IPOs.  Direct listings solve an efficiency problem in the US going-public 
market, in which well-funded, late-stage firms lack incentives to pursue a public listing, which 
would create liquidity for preexisting shareholders and allow for a more diverse body of public 
shareholders.  Direct listings have been allowed on the New York Stock Exchange since early 
2018, and four firms, Spotify, Slack, Asana, and Palantir, have gone public through this new listing 
mechanism.  While underwriters are heavily involved in the IPO process, serving the role as price-
stabilizers after the issue goes public, direct listings do not require a formal underwriter.  
Investment banks are often regarded as a necessity for stabilization in the going-public process, 
but this paper analyzes whether or not the overallotment option and lockup agreement in traditional 











In the history of public markets, listing and trading on an exchange has been the ultimate 
marker of a successful firm.  Underwriters serve as the gatekeepers to a public listing, and firms 
with a reputable financial track record are able to hire underwriters to launch an IPO in order to 
raise capital.  In recent years, the exceptional amount of funding available in private markets, 
especially for tech companies, has dissuaded firms from going public.  With ample amounts of 
cash available privately, firms have very little incentive to pay for the expensive IPO process and 
comply with Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.  It can be argued that staying 
private under these circumstances is not socially optimal.  There is no liquidity for insiders that 
have held shares privately for many years, and the ownership of the firm remains closely 
concentrated. 
A means of addressing this market inefficiency is the direct listing process, a public listing 
option which has been allowed on the London Stock Exchange since 1995 and the New York 
Stock Exchange since 2018.  In a direct listing, a firm’s shares that have been privately held are 
listed on an exchange under their preexisting ownership, at which point the shareholders (and 
greater market) may buy or sell at will.  By definition, there is no set open price determined by 
underwriters--it is a perfect example of inceptive market-driven price discovery. 
As mentioned, the crux of the direct listing under current market regulations is that firms 
cannot list new shares and therefore cannot raise capital.  Demand for this type of listing has 
therefore been limited.  The firms that pursue direct listings have tended to be more mature and 
are interested in providing their shareholders with liquidity.  In the US, there have been only four 
direct listings since 2018: Spotify (’18), Slack (’19), Asana (’20), and Palantir (’20) (the latter two 
went public on the same day).  Nevertheless there is growing domestic interest in direct listings, 
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which may be fueled by recent regulatory appeals to permit firms to list new shares, and therefore 
raise capital, in direct listings on the NYSE.  Although this regulation is being challenged as of 
9/2/20 by the Council of Institutional Investors, the simple fact that firms potentially have the 
opportunity to list new shares and start trading on an exchange without going through the 
underwriting “gatekeeper” has significant implications for the future of public markets.  
By the numbers, direct listings are not as “exciting” as their peer IPOs.  Using the London 
Stock Exchange as a reference (which has an almost 25-year history of direct listings), firms that 
pursue direct listing are 215% larger than their IPO counterparts, have 36% lower investment rates, 
and 53% lower three-year sales growth rates (Zheng, 2020).  In the case study of the four firms 
which have gone public though direct listings in the US, their listed offer amount is over 18 times 
greater than the average offer amount for IPOs during the same period of time.  These statistics 
are indicative of late-stage firms that do not need to raise new capital, but rather choose to list 
publicly for the sake of shareholder liquidity. 
Given the small sample size of direct listings on the NYSE, there have not been any 
empirical studies on the returns of firms following a direct listing.  Research on the IPO market, 
on the other hand, has provided potential investors with important information regarding the initial 
underpricing of shares, as well as a general trajectory for how newly listed companies will trade 
on the exchange in the months after they go public. 
Two conventional aspects of IPOs that greatly influence the price of the issue (Hong et. 
Al., 2004) are well-known to investors: lockups and greenshoe options.  When firms go public 
through an IPO,  most private shareholders are subject to a lockup agreement, and only 10-20% of 
shares are issued to the public in advance of the lockup’s expiration, which is generally 180 days 
after listing (Ofek and Richardson, 2000).  With massively constrained volume, investors take care 
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in their decisions to buy or increase their position in a new listing before the lockup expires.  If the 
lockup constrains supply too severely,  investment banks have the ability to manipulate the supply 
of the stock by use of a greenshoe, otherwise known as an overallotment option, as provided for 
in the company’s prospectus.  These options allow underwriters to sell up to 15% more shares than 
the original amount set up by the issue for 30 days after the issue went public (Jenkinson and Jones, 
2007).  In practice, underwriters will intentionally underprice an offer, let investor demand spike 
in response to the cheap listing, and then gradually increase the number of shares in the market for 
30 days after the listing.  If the price of the new offer starts to fall, investment banks are also able 
to buy back large portions of the newly-listed firm to buoy the price. 
Lockups (with the exception of Palantir, as discussed in the literature review) and 
overallotment options are not used in direct listings.  These two components of IPOs are referred 
to as price stabilization mechanisms (Jenkinson and Jones), but the advent of direct listings on the 
NYSE may prove that they are anything but successful stabilizers.  This paper examines how the 
pricing volatility of direct listings differs from traditional IPOs during the first 60 days of trading 
in an effort to determine if the involvement of an underwriter in the going-public process creates 




 The vast amount of literature on going-public markets falls short on the subject of direct 
listings.  While the novelty of the direct listing process on the NYSE has inspired several law-
reviews, (Cope et al., 2020; Nickerson, 2019; Jaffe et al., 2018), there has yet to be an empirical 
study that analyzes any trading differences between firms that go public through direct listings and 
firms that go public through a traditional IPO.  To realize optimal market efficiency, shareholders 
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and potential buyers of firms that go public through a direct listing should understand trends in 
initial price discovery and any predicable trading volatility.  This paper offers the first 
comprehensive analysis of the pricing volatility of securities that entered the public market through 
a direct listing on the New York Stock Exchange. 
 Direct listings are relevant to study as a mode of understanding the relationship between 
private and public markets, specifically with regard to the innovations that drive an efficient 
dynamic between the two.  A Morgan Stanley review of private/public market exchanges 
(Mauboussin and Callahan, 2020) points out that equity markets have become more sophisticated 
over time to provide investors and issuers with financially-innovative solutions where there was 
once an inefficiency.  Over the past 20 some-odd years, there has been a growing need to find a 
solution to the issue of providing early investors and insiders with liquidity in firms that have 
chosen to stay private.  Historically, the 1940s through the 1970s saw the birth of thousands of 
firms with high capital requirements to manufacturer physical products, and the fastest method for 
these firms to raise capital was the IPO process (Mauboussin and Callahan).  Singe the 1970s, the 
world has experienced a wave of companies that produce intangible assets, which oftentimes have 
lower capital requirements.  More recently yet, private equity and venture capital firms have 
invested an exceptional amount of private capital which does not incur the cost of complying with 
the SEC or paying for an IPO, which costs $44 million on average (Zheng, 2020).  These factors 
have disincentivized going public, which leaves shareholders with little liquidity and results in 
more closely-held firms.  Arguments in favor of remaining private suggest that privately held firms 
are more innovative (Ferreira et al., 2012), and that private equity investment is value-enhancing 
by providing tax benefits and knowledge of how to exploit arbitrage opportunities (Masulis and 
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Thomas, 2009).  That said, these benefits are not applicable to the well-funded, late-stage 
companies that exist in today’s private markets.   
As more innovative modes of raising capital and entering public markets surface, the 
going-public decision becomes more complicated.  Literature on going public in the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g., Booth and Smith, 1986; Jain and Kini, 1999; Ritter, 1987) broadly concludes that 
small, underfunded firms oftentimes benefit from the discretion and flexibility of private markets, 
but there are diminishing returns to staying private as firms mature.  Companies that are interested 
in pursuing future mergers or acquisitions or wish to diversify their shareholder base in a more 
liquid environment benefit from being publicly traded.  In recent years, however, these firms that 
it seems would best be suited for public markets have oftentimes chosen to stay private.  The 
reasons for this decision are primarily financial, given the inordinate cost of IPOs, and the 
immediate pricing “pop” of 21% on the first day of trading (for venture-backed firms that went 
public during the period of 2009-2019) leaves a considerable amount of money on the table 
(Mauboussin and Callahan).  “Money on the table” refers to the additional amount of money that 
firms could have raised in their IPO if their shares were not underpriced, as the pricing “pop” is 
money that investors earn, not the firm itself.  Money on the table can be simply calculated as the 
difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price, multiplied by 
the number of new shares issued.  The result of this deterrent to go public is that fewer companies 
are listed on exchanges every year, and the range of investors that have access to equity positions 
in new companies is increasingly exclusive to institutional investors. 
 Two new modes of going public have emerged in light of recent market disincentives to 
pursue an IPO: special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and direct listings.  SPACs are 
publicly listed shell companies that exist with the sole purpose of acquiring private companies.  
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SPACs use the capital raised from their IPO to acquire a firm that wants to go public but does not 
wish to engage in the IPO process due to the high costs and burden on senior management.  A 
firm’s CEO typically decides to sell their company to a SPAC if they are otherwise interested in 
selling the company, making SPACs not necessarily viewed as a “mode of going public” in the 
eyes of a CEO.  A direct listing is a means of going public that is intended to solve the market 
inefficiency of IPOs.  While private placement markets, such as the NASDAQ Private Market, 
have existed for many years to create better liquidity within privately held firms, they tend to only 
make markets for institutional investors (Horton, 2019).  Like markets for private placements, 
direct listings are a method by which a firm can list its shares on an exchange without going 
through the traditional process of an initial public offering.  Market makers describe direct listings 
as supply and demand-driven events that democratize the traditional IPO process (Giacchi, 2020).  
The legal and practical structure of direct listings differ across exchanges, and for the purpose of 
this paper, I will focus on direct listings on the New York Stock Exchange.  Most literature on the 
subject of direct listings comes in the form of legal reviews (Nickerson, 2019; Horton, 2019), 
especially in regard to the differences between IPOs and direct listings.  Below, I provide a 
summary of the major differences between the two listing methods in practice, as well as the bare-
minimum requirements of a direct listing on the NYSE, denoted as “Pure.”  Thus far, no firm has 
chosen to engage in a minimum-requirement direct listing as the marketing and oversight that 
investment banks provide has been considered a necessity as investors, firms, banks, and the NYSE 








Table 1: Legislative and Practical Differences Between IPOs and Direct Listings* 
 





Purpose Raise capital, 
liquidity, 




































Listing application Listing application Listing application 
Role of Investment 
Banks 
Underwriter Financial advisor Financial advisor 
Cost (Size of Firm) $130.5 million 
(exceptionally large) 
$37 million (large) 
$29.5 million** N/A 
Price Discovery Investment banks sets 
an offer price 
Financial advisors 
and NYSE set a guide 
price 
NYSE sets a guide 
price 
Money on the Table $77.74 million *** $0 $0 
Lockup Yes, 10 - 20% float 
on average 
SPOT, WORK, 
ASAN (no lockup) 
PLTR (23% float) 
No lockup 
* The table is a modified version of on produced by Horton, 2019. 
** $29.5M is the average SPOT and WORK paid investment banks to serve as financial advisors.  ASAN and PLTR 
have not made this amount public. 
*** Average 2018-2020. 
 
Role of Investment Banks 
In an IPO, investment banks function as underwriters, which involves aiding in legal 
filings, writing the prospectus, valuing the issuer, producing research, hosting a roadshow, book 
building, and underwriting any settlement risk.  In a direct listing, investment banks are not 
necessary, although they may serve as financial advisors to assist in marketing the issuer and 
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building an accessible equity story, as well act as a high-touch market maker on the days just 
before and after the listing.  In some cases, investment banks will advise private placements prior 
to a direct listing if an issuer is interested in raising capital. 
 
Price Discovery 
 In an IPO, the underwriting team produces a valuation for an issuer which is determined 
by balancing the interests of existing shareholders and securing a high demand in the public 
markets (sought out through work done by the syndicate desk).  Continued investor feedback 
throughout the IPO process helps determine a logical price.  In some events, the introduction of 
public opinion can highlight an unrealistic prior valuation made through private placements (as 
was the case with WeWork’s abandoned IPO).  The resulting offer price tends to undervalue the 
firm, favoring the interests of investors over existing shareholders.  In a direct listing, investors do 
not begin trading on the back of a pre-determined valuation, rather, the NYSE and financial 
advisor, if the firm chooses to have one, produce a general guide price.  In the case of Slack, 
financial advisors estimated several days before the firm went public that they would set a 
reference price between $14 and $46, ultimately settling on $26 the night before the listing.  This 
reference price has minimal bearing on the price that the firm starts publicly trading at, as a process 
of market-driven price discovery ensues on the morning of the listing, in which buyers and sellers 
arrive at an optimal price through their requested orders.  On the morning of Slack’s listing, market 
players drove the price up 48% to $38.50 before it publicly launched on the exchange.  While this 
process may sound enigmatic, it is no different from how an exchange determines daily opening 
prices for securities.  For direct listings, a stock exchange effectively builds an orderbook, whereby 
buyers and sellers may request a price and volume to trade.  Once enough sales have been initiated 
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 Beyond due diligence, marketing, and financial advisory, the primary role of an investment 
bank in the IPO process is to stabilize the price off the listing after the firm goes public.  The two 
mechanisms that underwriters have for price stabilization are lockups and overallotment options.  
IPOs traditionally have lockup agreements, which require insiders who owned shares prior to the 
firm going public to hold their shares until a set number of days (generally 180, although 
sometimes up to six months) after the company goes public.  Beyond mitigating a scenario where 
all existing shareholders sell their positions upon a firm going public, the economic rationale for a 
lockup is that it alleviates moral hazard problems and rent extraction by underwriters, who would 
profit from a higher initial volume of trades (Hong et.al., 2004).  By virtue of how many shares 
are designated in the lockup agreement, underwriters allow a set percentage of the total shares to 
freely trade when a company initially goes public, which is referred to as the “float.”  An IPO float 
is typically only 10 - 20% of the company’s total stock, which creates a supply-constrained 
environment, making true price discovery challenging.  In fact, limited liquidity during the lockup 
period tends to make the stock price artificially inflate, setting a precedent for the firm to be 
moderately over-valued.   
 If undersupply becomes a problem and the stock price is too volatile within the first 30 
days of being publicly traded, underwriters can utilize the overallotment option written in the 
prospectus (otherwise known as a greenshoe).  This clause allows the underwriters to stabilize the 
price of the issue by augmenting the number of shares listed on the market.  Underwriters are able 
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to increase the offer by 15%, usually by slowly issuing new shares at the market price, which 
allows a broader range of investors to buy the issue.  If, on the other hand, the new listing’s price 
falls unprecedentedly, the underwriter will buy back stock and hold it on their books to constrain 
the market supply and artificially inflate prices. 
The first two direct listings did not chose to have  lockup agreements, as providing liquidity 
for the going-public event itself requires former private shareholders to sell some of their shares 
immediately upon listing.  When Asana and Palantir pursued their direct listings on September 
30th, 2020, Asana stayed true to the precedent set by former direct listings and did not include a 
lockup, while Palantir place most of their shares under a lockup which will expire after their first 
earnings report in December 2020.  Currently, roughly 23% of Palantir’s shares are actively 
tradable, which is above the average IPO float.  Without a lockup, the public market for a new 
listing is fully supplied and investors are arguably able to engage in more efficient price discovery 
without an impending down-turn in price after the lockup expires.  While Palantir’s lockup will 
expire after this paper was written, it will be curious to see how investors react to an influx of 
shares on the market.  While lockups may provide some semblance of stabilization, direct listings 
do not have any formal price stabilization mechanisms due to their lack of an underwriter, making 
them a riskier option for companies that are worried about how investors will value their future 
cashflows. 
-- 
Given all of the differences between IPOs and direct listings, in general it can be stated that 
larger, more established firms with a diversified shareholder base, a well-known equity story, and 
no need to raise additional capital may choose to pursue a direct listing.  If a firm of this description 
instead opts into an IPO, it may be on the basis of concern that their share price will drop after the 
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first day of trading.  Direct listings do not have the advantage of an overallotment option, making 
it difficult for an investment bank to intervene and manipulate the share price. 
It is the role of an investment bank in an IPO to predict and control the share price of a 
recently-listed company, and the actions taken by investment banks in advance of and during the 
first few weeks of trading are at the heart of the academic literature on IPOs.  There is an incredible 
amount of research on IPO underpricing, in which researchers consider the prices at which firms 
trade in the days and weeks following their public listing (Ruud, 1993; Booth and Chua, 1996; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  These papers almost entirely deal with how the underwriter impacts 
trading, and whether or not initial returns are backed up by a legitimate underlying demand.  The 
root question regarding market efficiency in these IPO studies can also be applied to direct listings.  
In the case of direct listings, is market-driven price discovery the most efficient way for a new 
listing to start trading, or do investment banks provide indispensable stability? 
 
Data 
The list of stocks analyzed in this paper was sourced from the NASDAQ’s website, which 
compiles the ticker symbol, date, price, number of shares listed, and offer amount of all securities 
that were publicly listed through an IPO on the NASDAQ and NYSE.  The scope of my paper 
covers firms that initially listed on the NASDAQ or NYSE between January 1st, 2018 and October 
15th, 2020, and I studied the returns of firms through November 11th, 2020 in order to have 
sufficient return data from firms that listed in October 2020. 
The NASDAQ’s website included an initial list of 798 securities that went public during 
this period.  Of the 798 companies, 122 tickers were not actively associated with a company.  From 
the list of tickers not found, 116 ended in “U,” which indicated that they were unit offerings.  An 
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additional 137 unit offerings were found in the dataset.  All 253 unit offerings were removed due 
to the fact that units are products that include more than one class of security, and they do not serve 
as a legitimate comparison to direct listings. 
The six companies that were not actively identifiable under the ticker listed from the 
NASDAQ and were also not units were independently researched and added back into the dataset 
– the tickers were not initially found because they had either been changed or subsequently 
acquired. 
Of the remaining 545 companies, seven were removed from the study because they were 
previously trading on an OTC market before their IPO.  Three additional companies were removed 
because they had zero trading volume for over 10 days within the range of this paper’s analysis, 
resulting in no trading prices being published for those days.  Four companies were removed from 
the list of IPOs because they went public through a direct listing (SPOT, WORK, ASAN, 
PLTR).  These four firms were studied separately in this paper.  Ultimately, this paper studies 531 
companies that went public through an IPO, and four companies that went public through a direct 
listing. 
Using the tickers from the list of companies described above, I “web scraped” time-series 
trading data from Yahoo Finance for the first 60 trading days after each company’s IPO.  The data 
included the stock’s opening price, closing price, daily high, and daily low.  I used the stock’s 
closing price as opposed to a computed adjusted close because a dividend would not have been 
issued within the first 60 days of trading that I observed. 
I used the Crunchbase database to collect additional information on each firm that could 
serve as a predictive measure for increased volatility during trading.  Of the 531 IPOs and four 
direct listings in my dataset, Crunchbase had data for 483 (91%) of the IPOs and all four of the 
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direct listings.  All firms for which data were not available were still included in the study, but the 
values for the variables were left blank.  The Crunchbase data included information on the industry 
of the firm, the number of pre-IPO funding rounds the company had engaged in, the number of 
acquisitions the company had done, and the number of patents they held.  For the industry 
information, I used a dummy variable for tech companies (1 = tech, 0 = non-tech). 
Tables 2 and 3 provide, respectively, summary statistics for the IPOs and Direct Listings 
in my dataset; a more complete table of summary statistics for the data used in this paper can be 
found in the Appendix in Tables 11 and 12. 
 




Table 3: Direct Listing Summary Statistics by Year 
 
 
All summary statistics for 2020 are italicized, as the year 2020 had not concluded at the time this paper was submitted. 
 
The summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3 illustrate some of the primary differences between 
firms that pursued an IPO and those that pursued a direct listing within this study.  With respect to 
the size of the firm, the average offer amount of a direct listing was over 18 times the size of the 
offer amount of a IPO.  This is partially due to the previous funding rounds that these firms 
pursued, as the average firm that went public through a direct listing had done 17.5 funding rounds, 
as compared to the average firm that went public through an IPO, which had done 3.7 funding 
Year Number of IPOs First Day Returns Offer Price Offer Amount Money on the Table Tech Company Funding Rounds Acquisitions Patents
2018 199 43.8% $14.53 $237,063,859.00 $77,359,866.97 26.30% 3.4 1.3 37.2
2019 165 17.2% $15.68 $271,860,196.00 $27,769,881.72 26.90% 4 0.9 21.1
2020 167 29.4% $16.90 $317,422,007.00 $127,553,670.15 23.40% 3.5 0.9 13.5
IPO Summary Statistics
Year Number of DLs First Day Returns Offer Price Offer Amount Money on the Table Tech Company Funding Rounds Acquisitions Patents
2018 1 -10.2% $165.90 $9,245,852,532.00 $0.00 100% 20 18 293
2019 1 0.3% $38.50 $4,559,541,140.00 $0.00 100% 12 7 104
2020 2 34.1% $14.13 $1,247,436,297.50 $0.00 100% 19.3 3 355
Direct Listing Summary Statistics
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rounds.  These differences are indicative of the fact that firms pursuing direct listings chose their 
method of listing because they do not need to raise more capital. 
Exogenous market factors at any given time have massive implications on a firm’s returns.  
To compare the returns of the above companies in a relative fashion, I used the NASDAQ 
composite index as a measure of daily market returns.  I downloaded the NASDAQ composite 
index’s trading data (open, close, daily high, and daily low; listed in points) for the period of the 
study, 1/1/2018 - 11/12/20.  Using the NASDAQ returns, I computed the excess returns of the 
various firms for their first 60 days of trading: 
((stock_closet - stock_closet-1) / (stock_closet-1)) - ((index_closet - index_closet-1) / (index_closet-1))    (1) 
 
For a stock’s first day of trading, I used the price of the issue, which tended to result in incredibly 
high excess returns on the first day of trading as issues are intentionally underpriced.  I also used 
the “issue price” to calculate the excess returns for the four firms which went public through a 
direct listing.  While the issue price functions as a guide rather than as an actual price at which 
new shares list, it still serves as a marker from which liquidity develops prior to actually going 
public on the first day of trading.  While excess returns are the industry-standard metric of 
calculating volatility, I also calculated a measure of intraday trading volatility to have a metric for 
stock price movement throughout the day.  Intraday volatility was calculated on a daily basis by: 
((stock_hight - stock_lowt-1) / (stock_opent-1)) - ((index_hight - index_lowt-1) / (index_opent-1))    (2) 
 
As one would expect, stock price movements at the daily extremes were much more drastic than 




Economic Theory and Model 
 Using the data described above, I initially looked at returns over the 60 day period 
following public listing for both IPOs and direct listings.  To present a full spectrum of returns, 
this paper looks at absolute returns, relative returns versus the closing price on the first day of 
trading, and average relative returns within 10-day bins.  Given the fact that IPOs are initially 
underpriced, they may outperform more than direct listings for the first few days after going public, 
which will be observable in the results.  For the relative returns analyzed in 10-day bins, there may 
be noticeable differences in the returns before and after 30 days of trading if utilization of the 
overallotment clause significantly contributes to returns. 
 As discussed in the data section, I created a measure of “intraday” volatility and analyzed 
statistical differences between intraday volatility in IPOs and direct listings.  Given its method of 
calculation, intraday volatility will likely be greater than daily excess returns, and it will serve as 
a better indicator of  how much observable price movement listings experience within their first 
60 days of trading.  An apparent difference between IPOs and direct listings may be observable 
here, as constraint from the lockup and price manipulation by underwriters could cause higher 
spikes in the price of IPOs. 
 If there is an observable difference in volatility between IPOs and direct listings, the reason 
for this difference may be explained by several factors: the involvement of investment banks, the 
type of firm that has chosen the direct listing method thus far, or investor concern about buying 
direct listings.  This paper looks for any characteristics of IPOs that may result in higher or lower 
volatility, and applies the significant findings to direct listings.  If, in example, the direct listings 
have characteristics that are associated with statistically higher volatility but the model found that 
they have empirically lower volatility (or vice versa), investment banks may be to blame. 
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Using OLS,  this paper runs the following regressions to find characteristics that may be 
associated with statistically higher or lower volatility: 
 
𝑌" = 	𝛽& + 𝛽(𝑋1" + 𝛽+𝑋2" + 𝛽-𝑋3" + 𝛽/𝑋4" + 𝛽1𝑋5" + 𝛽3𝑋6" + 𝑢( 
Yi = (1) Intraday Volatility Days 1-10, (2) Intraday Volatility Days 11-20, (3) Intraday Volatility 
Days 21-30, (4) Intraday Volatility Days 31-60, (5) Excess Returns Days 1-10, (6) Excess Returns 
Days 11-20, (7) Excess Returns Days 21-30, (8) Excess Returns Days 31-60 
X1i = Offer Price 
X2i = Number of Shares Issued 
X3i = Tech Company Dummy Variable (1 = tech, 0 = not tech) 
X4i = Number of Funding Rounds Prior to Listing 
X5i = Number of Acquisitions 






(a) Summary Statistics 
The most interesting and relevant results of this study come in the form of summary 
statistics.  From an absolute standpoint, without comparing the new listing’s returns to the market, 
IPOs performed much better than direct listings.  Absolute returns for the 10th day of trading were 
calculated by applying the following formula, assuming t = the first day of trading.   
((stock_closet+10 - stock_closet) / (stock_closet))      (3) 
 
Table 4: Absolute Returns in the Days Following Public Listing 
 





Absolute Returns From Close on First Day of Trading
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The table above indicates that, with the exception of the first 10 days of trading for IPOs, most 
new listings have negative returns following the close on the first day of trading.  This is no 
surprise, given the fact that the price on the first day is often driven above its realistic value as 
investors vie for shares of a newly listed company.  While it could be surmised that the average 
1.5% return from the close on the first day to the close on the 10th day can be attributed to 
investment banks exercising the overallotment option in the IPO’s offering terms, the sample size 
of direct listings is too small to discern a statistically significant difference, and the absolute 
changes in price do not account for systemic risk. 
Using the NASDAQ returns, I computed the excess returns over 10, 20, 30, and 60 trading 
days to parallel Table 4, in which I found the average returns from the close of the first day of 
trading.  Using 10 days of trading as an example, the excess returns were calculated as follows: 
((stock_closet+10 - stock_closet) / (stock_closet)) - ((index_closet+10 - index_closet) / (index_closet))    (4) 
 
Table 5: Relative Returns in the Days Following Public Listing 
 
 
In contrast to Table 4, Table 5 shows that IPOs tend to have positive excess returns through the 
first 60 days of trading, even after the “pop” on the first day of trading.  Direct listings, conversely, 
underperform the market on average (by a substantial amount).  Looking at the performance of 
specific stocks from the direct listing group, the underperformance is largely due to the prices of 
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ASAN and WORK slowly falling through the weeks after they each started trading.  With such a 
small sample size, two stocks falling can easily upset the group’s average. 
 In order to better understand the impact that investment banks have on IPOs in comparison 
to the lack of influence they have over direct listings, it is important to separate the returns for the 
first 30 days of trading, when investment banks may utilize the overallotment option to add new 
shares in the market.  In the following days of trading (31-60), underwriters have less control over 
the stock price, and IPOs and direct listings should have more comparable returns if all else were 
equal.  Table 6 was calculated by finding the average returns (as detailed in Equation 1) and 
standard deviation from each day of trading, and then creating bins by computing the average for 
each 10-day period. 
 




Table 6 shows that IPOs have, on average, high excess returns for the first 10 days of trading, 
followed by very minimal returns, if any, for the next 50 days.  Looking at the average returns on 
a daily basis, found in the Appendix in Table 13, the high excess returns for IPOs during the first 
10 days of trading is entirely concentrated on the first day of trading, which has an average return 
of 31%.  The direct listings have very moderate and steady returns for the first 30 days of trading, 
followed by underperformance over the next 30 days.  To reference Table 13 again, direct listings 
Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev.
1 - 10 3.3% 23.4% 0.3% 4.8%
11 - 20 0.0% 5.3% 0.4% 2.6%
21 - 30 -0.2% 5.4% 0.4% 3.6%
31 - 40 0.0% 5.2% -0.1% 2.0%
41 - 50 0.1% 5.2% 0.1% 1.3%






have as average excess return of 13.7% on their first day of trading, which is only 44.2% of the 
pricing “pop” that IPOs have.  As discussed in the Data section of this paper, it is important to note 
that returns for the first day of trading were calculated by taking the percentage change between 
the offer price and the closing price.  In the case of IPOs, the offer price is intended to be below 
the value of the firm at a price-per-share level, whereas the direct listing offer price (which only 
serves as a guideline), must be within the anticipated price range listed on the registration 
statement.  Therefore, direct listings should not merit excess returns on their first day of trading 
unless market players believe that the firm is undervalued in their registration statement.  A 
potential explanation for a pricing pop on the first day a direct listing trades publicly is that 
investors associate abnormally high returns with “investor excitement” around new listings, 
believing that excess returns are a default outcome of all new listings, while in actuality, 
investment banks artificially create the outperformance. 
Table 6 shows that the second 30 days of trading for both IPOs and direct listings are 
relatively comparable.  The only exception is days 51-60 for direct listings, which is the result of 
WORK falling 14.5% during the period for unrelated reasons.  Assuming the second 30 days of 
trading are held constant, the intervention of investment banks for the first 30 days of trading 
results in a quick price jump, followed by very minimal returns against the market.  Direct listings, 
on the other hand, perform more consistently for the first 30 day of trading. 
While volatility is usually examined through standard deviation and excess returns, the 
issue of price manipulation by investment banks may be better examined by looking at intraday 
price movements.  The large block trades issued to buy back stock (in the case of a price fall) result 
in a large difference between the stock’s daily high and low prices.  The following table displays 
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intraday stock price movements (minus the intraday index movements), sorted in bins, calculated 
by Equation 2. 





Table 7 shows that, for all bins from the first through the 60th day of trading, firms that went public 
through an IPO have higher intraday price movements than those that went public through a direct 
listing.  Given the fact that IPOs continue to have high intraday trading during the period of 30 – 
60 days after going public, the difference in intraday pricing volatility between IPOs and direct 
listings cannot be explained by the involvement of investment banks.  It is likely that direct listings 
have lower price movements throughout the day because no new shares are listed during their 
going-public process, so there is lower turnover of shares. 
 Figures 1 and 2 are graphs of the excess returns and intraday price movement for IPOs and 
direct listings.  From a visual standpoint in Figure 1, the excess returns from direct listings track 
excess returns from IPOs, the only difference being that the small sample size of direct listings 
produces more aggressive swings on the graph.  The first day of trading is the only time that there 
appears to be a substantial difference in the returns from IPOs and direct listings, which is reflected 
numerically in Table 6.  The same cannot be said for Figure 2, which shows that the intraday price 
movements for direct listings are significantly lower than those for IPOs.  A logarithmic trendline, 
calculated by Equation 5, was included in Figure 2 to mimic a larger number of direct listing 
Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev.
1 - 10 7.7% 8.0% 4.5% 2.3%
11 - 20 5.8% 6.1% 2.4% 1.7%
21 - 30 5.8% 5.4% 4.0% 2.8%
31 - 40 5.9% 5.2% 2.5% 1.7%
41 - 50 5.7% 6.7% 2.2% 1.0%
51 - 60 5.5% 5.1% 5.1% 4.1%





observations.  The trendline on the graph remains 1.5% - 2% below the average intraday movement 
for IPOs, as is clear in Table 7. 
Y = m1* ln(X) + C   (5) 
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 Given the significantly lower intraday volatility of direct listings, this paper further 
examines what may cause a difference in volatility.  The direct listings have an average offer 
amount of over $4 billion, whereas most IPOs in the study are significantly smaller, with an 
average offer amount of $273 million.  In Table 8 and Figure 3, direct listings are compared to 
IPOs with an offer amount over $500 million, which account for 12.8% of the total study.  
 




Figure 3: Intraday Price Movement (Large IPOs) 
 
 
Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev.
1 - 10 6.1% 4.0% 4.5% 2.3%
11 - 20 3.7% 2.0% 2.4% 1.7%
21 - 30 3.8% 2.2% 4.0% 2.8%
31 - 40 3.9% 2.2% 2.5% 1.7%
41 - 50 3.6% 1.9% 2.2% 1.0%
51 - 60 3.5% 1.9% 5.1% 4.1%
Intraday Price Movement (IPOs with an offer amount $500 million)
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Table 8 and Figure 3 show that IPOs of a similar size to direct listings have intraday volatility 
that is much more comparable to the direct listings in the study. 
 
(b) OLS Regression: predictive measures of volatility 
To further analyze factors that may impact trading volatility for both IPOs and direct listings, 
I examined potential predictive measures of volatility by running regressions for the excess return 
and intraday volatility bins in Tables 6 and 7.  My independent variables were factors that could 
potentially indicate higher trading volatility, including number of shares issued and number of 
funding rounds that occurred prior to going public.  All dependent variables are listed in Table 9, 
and their summary statistics are detailed in Table 10.  The regressions I ran are as follows: 
 
Table 9: Dependent Variables in OLS Regressions 
 
 
Table 10: OLS Regression Results 
 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.005 
Y Variables: Regression
Intra-Day Volatility Days 1-10 (1)
Intra-Day Volatility Days 11-20 (2)
Intra-Day Volatility Days 21-30 (3)
Intra-Day Volatility Days 31-60 (4)
Excess Returns Days 1-10 (5)
Excess Returns Days 11-20 (6)
Excess Returns Days 21-30 (7)
Excess Returns Days 31-60 (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offer Price -0.0006067 * -0.0006953 *** -0.0006741 *** -0.0009343 *** 0.000672 -0.0001908 0.0000473 0.0000558
(0.0002955) (0.002039) (0.0001834) (0.0002041) (0.0008135) (0.0000993) (0.0000939) (0.0000664)
Number of Shares Issued -2.35e-10 * -2.83e-10 *** -2.24e-10 *** -2.11e-11 *** 8.30e-10 ** -1.40e-12 -1.79e-11 2.00e-11
(1.12e-10) (7.76e-11) (6.97e-11) (6.10e-11) (3.10e-10) (3.78e-11) (3.57e-11) (1.98e-11)
Tech Company (dummy var.) 0.0132696 * -0.0008898 -0.0022441 -0.0048005 -0.0115519 0.0002522 0.0025983 -0.0012284
(0.0055755) (0.0038665) (0.0035158) (0.0030843) (0.153513) (0.0018832) (0.0018005) (0.001004)
Number of Funding Rounds 0.0015297 * 0.0014879 *** 0.0017733 *** 0.0016525 *** -0.0001234 0.0003296 0.0002339 0.0002334
(0.0006785) (0.004686) (0.0004299) (0.000377) (0.0018682) (0.0002282) (0.0002201) (0.0001227)
Number of Acquisitions -0.0020498 * -0.0010748 -0.0008834 -0.0007686 -0.0016134 0.0001656 -0.0000299 0.0000664
(0.0009419) (0.006502) (0.0006156) (0.0005407) (0.0025933) (0.0003167) (0.0003153) (0.000176)
Number of Patents -9.14e-6 1.62e-7 -0.0000217 -9.92e-6 -0.0000317 -1.03e-6 -4.34e-6 -4.86e-8
(0.0000288) (0.0000199) (0.0000178) (0.0000155) (0.0000794) (9.71e-6) (9.10e-6) (5.04e-6)
N 483 476 455 443 483 476 455 443
R-sq 0.0510 0.0917 0.0948 0.1270 0.0183 0.0110 0.0101 0.0202
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 The OLS regression in Table 9 shows that a number of variables have significant 
correlations with the 10-day bins of intraday volatility, while there are fewer correlations with 
excess returns.  While excess returns are important in regard to investor experience, they are not 
necessarily good indicators of how drastically the stock price moved throughout any given day in 
response to swings in investor sentiment or investment bank-involvement.  As shown in the 
regressions in Table 9, only one variable (number of shares issued during days 1-10 of trading) is 
a moderately significant predictor of excess returns among regressions 5 through 8. 
For the four intraday volatility regressions, three variables displayed significant 
correlation: offer price, number of shares issued, and number of funding rounds prior to listing.  
Offer price has a negative correlation to intraday volatility, which indicated that lower offer prices 
produce higher volatility.  The average offer price in the dataset is $15.64, and 131 companies 
(19%) have an offer price in the lowest end of the spectrum, from $4.00 to $11.88.  A former 
investment banker I spoke with on the subject commented that “Any company that goes public 
with an offer price under $12.00 is a bad company.”  While this comment is not based on any 
proven research, firms that choose to price their shares below the generally accepted offer price 
may be attempting to cater to a larger retail market, or are interested in appealing to investors with 
a price that appears to be “undervalued” in an attempt to mask poor financials.  Whatever the case, 
low offer prices tend to be associated with higher intraday volatility, especially in the first 11-60 
days of trading. 
Another significant indicator of intraday volatility is the number of shares that a firm issues, 
which has a negative relationship with volatility.  This correlation may be due to the fact that 
smaller firms tend to have less research published about them, and investors are unable to act 
efficiently in the absence of perfect information.  While the involvement of an investment bank in 
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the IPO process means that a prospectus exists with ample financial information about the firm, 
few investors following the going-public event itself choose to read the prospectus.  As information 
about the recently-public firm arises, investors may buy and sell erratically, as would be evident 
in the significant relationship with intraday volatility from days 11-60. 
The number of funding rounds a firm went through prior to going public has a positive 
statistical relationship with intraday volatility, meaning that a firm with more private shareholders 
has greater trading volatility.  This makes logical sense, as a more diversified group of large private 
shareholders will sporadically sell of major portions of their shares in the weeks after a company 
goes public.  As with the offer price and the number of shares issued, the significance of the number 
of private funding rounds a firm went through is most significant for days 11-60 of trading. 
 
(c) OLS Regressions: Implications on Direct Listings 
While it is not possible to run regressions for firms that went public through direct listings 
given the fact that the small sample has multicollinearity, the results of the OLS regression for 
IPOs can be applied to direct listings, as the indicators of increased volatility that are not tied to 
investment bank-influence should be consistent across all recently-public firms.  The results shown 
in Table 7, Table 13, and Figure 2 show that direct listings have lower intraday volatility than IPOs 
by 1.5% – 2% on average.  If the significant indicators of volatility found in the regression apply 
to the four firms that went public through a direct listing, then their lower intraday volatility can 





1. Offer Price 
The average IPO offer price in this study was $15.64, and the regression found that low offer 
prices are indicative of increased volatility.  In the case of the direct listings, the average offer 
price was $58.16, with only one offer price below the IPO average (PLTR, $7.25).  The high offer 
prices of the direct listings in this study may be indicative of their low intraday trading volatility. 
 
2. Number of Shares Issued 
In the regressions for IPO intraday volatility, a below-average number of shares issued was 
correlated with higher volatility.  The average number of shares issued in an IPO in the study was 
14,958,531.  Looking at direct listings, the average number of shares issued was 115,331,763, 
which is 7.7 times higher than the IPO average.  The large number of shares listed in the four direct 
indicates that the direct listings should have had low intraday trading volatility. 
 
3. Number of Funding Rounds Prior to Listing 
The OLS regression for IPO intraday volatility found that a large number of funding rounds 
prior to listing is positively correlated with high intraday volatility.  The average number of funding 
rounds that IPOs had prior to listing in the study was 3.65, while the average direct listing had 
done 17.75 funding rounds.  As of the time of this paper, firms cannot legally raise capital through 
direct listings, so it is effectively a requirement of the direct listing process to have had prior 
funding rounds.  In the case of IPOs, a larger number of funding rounds prior to going public likely 
indicates that the firm has a higher percentage of shares in a lockup.  If this were the case, a smaller 
supply of shares on the market before the expiration of the lockup is positively correlated with 
higher intraday volatility.  With the exception of PLTR, which has a lockup that includes 77% of 
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their total shares, the direct listings in this study allowed all of their shares to immediately begin 
trading upon listing.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a large number of funding rounds would create 
higher intraday volatility for direct listings. 
 
Conclusion 
In summation of my results, if the OLS regressions in Table 10 were applied to the direct 
listings in the study, the average offer price and number of shares issued should result in lower 
volatility on average, whereas the number of funding rounds before going public should indicate 
higher volatility, albeit, likely without application to direct listings.  The offer price of an issue 
multiplied by the number of shares issued produces the offer amount, therein, the regression shows 
that a high offer amount is negatively correlated with high intraday volatility.  Looking back at 
Table 8 and Figure 3, which compare IPOs with offer amounts over $500 million to direct listings, 
it is clear that IPOs with larger offer amounts have similarly low intraday volatility to direct 
listings.  It can therefore be surmised that the direct listings in this study have significantly lower 
intraday volatility than their IPO counterparts in large part because of their high offer amount. 
While this paper does not prove that the involvement of underwriters in the IPO process results 
in higher price volatility for the first 60 days of trading, it does provide a framework with which 
to analyze direct listings going forward.  The direct listings in this study were a homogenous group 
(large tech companies that engaged in above-average numbers of funding rounds), but when a 
more heterogenous group of firms go public through direct listings, a closer comparison can be 
made to firms that pursue IPOs.  This comparison will be especially important if the SEC rules 
that firms are able to list primary shares in a direct listing.  Thus far, only well-funded firms have 
been able to pursue direct listings because of their legal inability to raise capital in their chosen 
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mode of going-public.  If firms are able to raise capital in direct listings, investment bank 
involvement will be the only true difference between IPOs and direct listings, especially given the 
fact that direct listings will likely all have lockups if they issue primary shares. 
The role of investment banks as the underwriters of IPOs has been a consistent pillar of going-
public, but their necessity may lessen in a marketplace with modern trading technology and 
information-sharing platforms.  As discussed in the Literature Review, financial markets 
constantly give rise to innovations that push the status-quo of near-efficiency, and direct listings 
an innovation that begins to solve the potential inefficiency of investment banks.  Direct listings 
are likely a permanent phenomenon on US exchanges, and the regulatory framework surrounding 
the listing process remains in-flux.  If more firms choose to go public through direct listings, 
market players and academics will continue to analyze the practical difference between the two 















Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Offer Price 531 15.64331 8.167055 4 120
Number of Shares Issued 531 15,000,000         23300000 240,000              207,000,000        
Tech Company (dummy var.) 483 0.2546584 0.4361207 0 1
Number of Funding Rounds 483 3.654244 3.581667 0 27
Number of Acquisitions 483 1.039337 2.865684 0 26
Number of Patents 483 24.38095 88.99534 0 1075
Volatility Days 1-10 531 0.0801512 0.055087 -0.0205991 0.4890732
Volatility Days 11-20 521 0.0577601 0.0384264 -0.0159583 0.2957589
Volatility Days 21-30 498 0.0567931 0.0361074 -0.0154244 0.3226879
Volatility Days 31-60 486 0.0567931 0.0301787 -0.017539 0.2085283
Excess Returns Days 1-10 531 0.033896 0.1475376 -0.0957727 2.183652
Excess Returns Days 11-20 521 0.0005254 0.0167213 -0.0791905 0.1197586
Excess Returns Days 21-30 498 -0.0013983 0.0167124 -0.0607478 0.1124222
Excess Returns Days 31-60 486 0.0000745 0.0091384 -0.0368434 0.0393018
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Offer Price 4 58.1625 72.95459 7.25 165.9
Number of Shares Issued 4 115,000,000        102,000,000           30,000,000    257,000,000        
Number of Funding Rounds 4 17.75 7.932003 11 28
Number of Acquisitions 4 7.75 7.5 0 18
Number of Patents 4 276.75 313.2639 0 710
Volatility Days 1-10 4 0.045407 0.0122281 0.0331289 0.0622643
Volatility Days 11-20 4 0.0243536 0.0062263 0.0180116 0.0324229
Volatility Days 21-30 4 0.0403781 0.0203492 0.0272724 0.070363
Volatility Days 31-60 2 0.0314546 0.0122314 0.0228057 0.0401035
Excess Returns Days 1-10 4 0.0032007 0.0193929 -0.0172718 0.0243862
Excess Returns Days 11-20 4 0.0040492 0.0134092 -0.0119425 0.0171617
Excess Returns Days 21-30 4 0.0035163 0.0162025 -0.0090682 0.0269024
Excess Returns Days 31-60 2 -0.0028955 0.00798 -0.0085382 0.0027473
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Table 13: Daily Excess Returns and Intraday Price Movements Following Public Listing 
 
Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev.
1                     31.0% 141.2% 17.5% 16.9% 13.7% 23.2% 12.7% 5.8%
2                     0.5% 9.3% 10.1% 9.9% -5.1% 3.9% 6.9% 1.7%
3                     1.9% 43.2% 7.5% 6.8% -0.8% 2.1% 3.6% 2.1%
4                     0.0% 7.3% 6.9% 8.3% -1.1% 4.6% 2.1% 1.8%
5                     0.1% 5.9% 6.5% 7.1% 5.6% 4.3% 5.3% 5.0%
6                     0.5% 6.8% 6.0% 7.0% -0.7% 1.9% 4.0% 1.3%
7                     -0.4% 5.3% 6.0% 7.8% -0.2% 2.5% 3.3% 0.4%
8                     0.1% 5.1% 5.6% 5.5% -2.8% 1.5% 2.7% 2.0%
9                     -0.1% 4.9% 5.5% 5.1% -2.2% 2.8% 2.1% 1.5%
10                   -0.1% 4.9% 5.5% 5.3% -3.0% 1.1% 2.7% 1.3%
11                   -0.2% 4.1% 5.5% 4.8% -1.0% 1.9% 1.8% 0.9%
12                   0.1% 4.8% 5.6% 5.6% 3.3% 3.0% 3.5% 2.3%
13                   -0.1% 4.7% 5.7% 5.4% 0.0% 1.2% 2.0% 0.9%
14                   0.1% 4.8% 5.7% 5.3% 0.2% 3.0% 1.8% 2.0%
15                   0.3% 5.7% 5.6% 6.1% -0.7% 1.7% 1.8% 0.9%
16                   0.0% 5.5% 5.6% 5.7% -1.2% 2.1% 2.2% 1.4%
17                   0.4% 4.9% 5.6% 4.8% 1.6% 3.0% 2.3% 1.7%
18                   0.5% 6.2% 6.2% 7.1% -1.0% 1.2% 3.1% 1.1%
19                   -0.3% 5.1% 5.9% 5.3% 1.3% 3.0% 1.7% 1.6%
20                   -0.4% 6.7% 6.2% 10.8% 1.7% 6.2% 4.2% 4.3%
21                   -0.6% 5.8% 5.8% 5.3% -0.4% 1.1% 3.2% 2.4%
22                   -0.5% 4.5% 5.9% 5.4% 1.7% 3.4% 3.3% 2.1%
23                   -0.4% 4.9% 6.0% 5.4% -3.6% 3.4% 4.5% 0.6%
24                   0.4% 4.8% 5.8% 5.4% -0.6% 3.9% 1.8% 0.7%
25                   0.1% 4.9% 5.7% 5.4% -0.7% 2.0% 2.6% 0.8%
26                   -0.1% 4.7% 5.3% 4.4% 0.6% 1.0% 2.2% 1.0%
27                   0.2% 6.6% 5.6% 6.1% 2.6% 6.1% 4.9% 4.2%
28                   -0.4% 5.5% 5.9% 5.2% 5.4% 7.7% 9.1% 9.2%
29                   -0.5% 4.7% 5.6% 4.9% 1.8% 3.8% 3.4% 3.5%
30                   0.0% 7.1% 6.0% 6.9% -3.2% 3.7% 5.4% 3.6%
31                   -0.4% 5.6% 6.0% 5.5% 3.2% 7.3% 4.0% 3.7%
32                   0.1% 5.1% 5.8% 5.4% 0.6% 3.8% 5.7% 5.2%
33                   -0.4% 4.9% 5.9% 5.0% -2.3% 1.2% 2.1% 1.9%
34                   0.1% 5.7% 5.9% 5.2% -2.6% 2.8% 3.2% 3.0%
35                   0.5% 6.1% 6.0% 5.9% -0.3% 0.8% 1.6% 0.0%
36                   0.1% 5.0% 6.2% 5.4% -0.5% 1.2% 1.3% 0.1%
37                   0.0% 4.4% 5.7% 4.7% 2.2% 0.3% 3.4% 2.3%
38                   0.0% 5.1% 5.8% 5.2% -0.8% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4%
39                   -0.1% 4.7% 5.5% 4.8% 1.3% 0.2% 1.3% 0.2%
40                   0.1% 5.3% 5.9% 5.1% -1.3% 0.8% 1.4% 0.1%
41                   0.5% 6.2% 5.9% 6.8% -1.0% 1.7% 0.9% 0.6%
42                   -0.1% 5.1% 5.8% 5.3% 1.8% 0.9% 1.9% 0.5%
43                   0.1% 5.1% 5.6% 6.2% -1.0% 0.6% 1.8% 0.1%
44                   0.4% 5.4% 5.9% 6.3% 0.8% 1.0% 2.5% 0.1%
45                   0.1% 4.6% 5.5% 4.9% 0.2% 1.0% 3.8% 2.8%
46                   0.0% 5.3% 5.4% 4.8% 0.6% 1.1% 0.9% 3.0%
47                   0.1% 5.1% 6.0% 17.2% 1.3% 0.6% 1.7% 0.7%
48                   -0.1% 5.4% 5.5% 5.4% 0.0% 4.4% 3.8% 0.3%
49                   0.4% 5.2% 5.8% 5.2% -0.2% 0.8% 2.4% 1.1%
50                   -0.5% 4.8% 5.6% 4.7% -1.3% 0.7% 2.5% 0.7%
51                   -0.3% 6.2% 5.5% 4.7% -1.9% 3.4% 3.0% 3.2%
52                   -0.6% 4.9% 5.3% 4.6% 2.5% 1.3% 4.5% 1.5%
53                   0.2% 5.0% 5.5% 5.0% 2.6% 5.8% 4.7% 3.7%
54                   -0.1% 4.7% 5.4% 4.9% -2.8% 3.4% 10.3% 12.0%
55                   -0.1% 4.7% 5.4% 4.9% -5.4% 4.5% 5.5% 4.4%
56                   0.0% 4.5% 5.4% 4.6% -2.8% 8.4% 7.6% 6.6%
57                   0.1% 5.7% 5.6% 6.5% 5.0% 3.3% 5.0% 5.0%
58                   0.0% 5.1% 5.4% 6.0% -2.8% 5.5% 2.6% 0.8%
59                   0.0% 5.2% 5.6% 5.0% -1.3% 3.5% 4.2% 2.1%
60                   -0.1% 4.6% 5.5% 4.9% -0.6% 5.0% 3.2% 2.2%
Days after 
Initial Offering
Excess Returns Intra-Day Price Movement
IPO
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